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We examine the maximal-element rationalizability of choice functions with arbitrary do-
mains. While rationality formulated in terms of the choice of greatest elements according
to a rationalizing relation has been analyzed relatively thoroughly in the earlier litera-
ture, this is not the case for maximal-element rationalizability, except when it coincides
with greatest-element rationalizability because of properties imposed on the rationalizing
relation. We develop necessary and suﬃcient conditions for maximal-element rationaliz-
ability by itself, and for maximal-element rationalizability in conjunction with additional
properties of a rationalizing relation such as reﬂexivity, completeness, P-acyclicity, quasi-
transitivity, consistency and transitivity. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation
No.: D11.
Keywords: Choice Functions, Maximal-Element Rationalizability.1 Introduction
The notion of rational choice as optimizing choice dates at least as far back as Robbins
(1932; 1935, p. 93), who asserted that “there is a sense in which the word rationality can be
used which renders it legitimate to argue that at least some rationality is assumed before
human behaviour has an economic aspect—the sense, namely, in which it is equivalent to
‘purposive’....” The elaborate ediﬁce of revealed preference theory `a l a Samuelson (1938;
1947, Chapter V; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950) was the ﬁrst formal treatment of
this notion of rational choice. The strong axiom of revealed preference due to Houthakker
was meant to be a suﬃcient condition for the demand function of a competitive consumer
to be derived by means of the optimization of an underlying preference ordering or utility
function. This line of research has been further explored by Arrow (1959), Richter (1966;
1971), Hansson (1968), Sen (1971), Suzumura (1976; 1977; 1983, Chapter 2), Bossert,
Sprumont and Suzumura (2001; 2002), and many others. Note, however, that the opti-
mization of a single underlying preference ordering or utility function is not the only way
of giving substance to the Robbinsian notion of ‘purposive behaviour.’ An alternative
model of purposive behavior may require that there exist multiple preference orderings
such that an alternative chosen from an option set is obtained by means of the maximiza-
tion of the intersection of these underlying preference orderings. If these orderings may
be construed as the individual preference orderings, the set of chosen options are nothing
other than the set of Pareto-eﬃcient options. Alternatively, the underlying preference
orderings may be construed as potential preference orderings which a decision-maker may
have in the future. In this case, the set of chosen options consists solely of those options
which will never be rejected whichever potential preference ordering may materialize in
the future. These examples will suﬃce to illustrate that the exploration of the Robbinsian
notion of rational choice in terms of the maximal elements according to an underlying
preference relation (which is not necessarily complete) is a worthwhile and important
subject to be explored. See Schwartz (1976) and Sen (1997) for further motivation of ex-
ploring maximal-element rationalizability rather than greatest-element rationalizability.
This paper is devoted to this issue. The analysis of necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
maximal-element rationalizability by general relations and on arbitrary domains has, so
far, not been explored thoroughly.
There are three identiﬁable domains of a choice function of historical importance. The
ﬁrst of these presupposes that the universal set is the commodity space (the non-negative
orthant of some ﬁnite-dimensional Euclidean space) and requires that the domain of a
1choice function consists of all budget sets (all non-degenerate subsets of the non-negative
orthant whose northeastern boundary is a hyperplane with a positive normal). Samuel-
son (1938; 1947, Chapter V; 1948; 1950) and Houthakker (1950) developed a revealed
preference theory for a competitive consumer under this domain restriction. Secondly,
capitalizing on an acute observation by Georgescu-Roegen (1954, p. 125; 1966, p. 222),
Arrow (1959) and Sen (1971) explored a new domain that includes all two-element sets
and all three-element sets. The theory of rational choice thus developed served as one of
the building blocks of non-binary social choice theory. See, for example, Sen (1977) and
Suzumura (1983, Chapter 3). The third domain, which was introduced by Richter (1966;
1971) and Hansson (1968), imposes no extraneous restriction whatsoever on the class of
feasible sets of options, thereby enabling the general theory of rational choice functions to
be pursued. Along with Suzumura (1976; 1977; 1983, Chapter 2) and Bossert, Sprumont
and Suzumura (2001; 2002), this paper attempts to explore the theory of rational choice
functions on this general domain. As opposed to those earlier contributions, however, we
focus on maximal-element rationalizability rather than greatest-element rationalizability.
The only restrictions we impose throughout are that the domain be non-empty and that
choices be decisive—that is, the set of chosen elements is always non-empty.
After formalizing alternative concepts of rationalizability in Section 2, we begin our
analysis in Section 3 by examining the logical relationships which hold between the dif-
ferent notions of maximal-element rationalizability. These diﬀerent versions of rational-
izability are obtained if (combinations of) additional properties such as reﬂexivity, com-
pleteness, P-acyclicity, quasi-transitivity, consistency (in the sense of Suzumura, 1976; see
Section 2 for a formal deﬁnition) and transitivity are imposed on rationalizing relations.
For each notion of maximal-element rationalizability, we provide a set of necessary and
suﬃcient conditions. In particular, Section 4 presents complete characterizations of those
notions of maximal-element rationalizability that are weaker than full rationalizability
(that is, rationalizability by an ordering, in which case maximal elements and greatest el-
ements coincide). Because of the diﬀerent nature of full rationalizability (and the diﬀerent
nature of the characterizing conditions involved), this form of rationalizability is analyzed
in a section of its own. In Section 5, we provide a new characterization that is formulated
in a framework analogous to that used in the previous section. This result provides an
important link between our approach and the earlier analysis of full rationalizability (in
particular, the axiomatization due to Richter, 1966), and it serves to illustrate how our
contribution ﬁts into the existing literature. Section 6 shows how the result of Section 5
can be simpliﬁed if the choice function is single-valued. Section 7 concludes with remarks
2on some further problems to be explored.
2 Alternative Concepts of Rationalizability
The set of positive integers is denoted by N. Let X be a universal non-empty set of
alternatives. X is the power set of X excluding the empty set. A choice function is
a mapping C:Σ →Xsuch that C(S) ⊆ S for all S ∈ Σ, where Σ ⊆Xwith Σ 6= ∅
is the domain of C. Note that C maps Σ into the set of all non-empty subsets of X.
Thus, according to Richter’s (1971) terminology, the choice function C is decisive. No
restrictions other than non-emptiness are imposed on the universal set X, or on the
domain of the choice function Σ. The alternatives x0,...,x K ∈ X with K ∈ N are said
to form a revealed preference chain of order K if there exist S1,...,SK ∈ Σ such that
xk−1 ∈ C(Sk) and xk ∈ Sk for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.
Let R ⊆ X × X be a (binary) relation on X. The asymmetric factor P(R)o fR
is deﬁned by (x,y) ∈ P(R) if and only if (x,y) ∈ R and (y,x) / ∈ R for all x,y ∈ X.
The symmetric factor I(R)o fR is deﬁned by (x,y) ∈ I(R) if and only if (x,y) ∈ R
and (y,x) ∈ R for all x,y ∈ X. The non-comparable factor N(R)o fR is deﬁned by
(x,y) ∈ N(R) if and only if (x,y) / ∈ R and (y,x) / ∈ R for all x,y ∈ X. The diagonal
relation on X is given by Rd = {(x,x) | x ∈ X}.
A relation R ⊆ X × X is (i) reﬂexive if, for all x ∈ X,( x,x) ∈ R; (ii) complete
if, for all x,y ∈ X such that x 6= y,( x,y) ∈ R or (y,x) ∈ R; (iii) P-acyclical if, for
all K ∈ N \{ 1} and for all x0,...,x K ∈ X,( xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}
implies (xK,x 0) / ∈ P(R); (iv) quasi-transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X,[ ( x,y) ∈ P(R) and
(y,z) ∈ P(R)] implies (x,z) ∈ P(R); (v) consistent if, for all K ∈ N \{ 1} and for all
x0,...,x K ∈ X,( xk−1,x k) ∈ R for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} implies (xK,x 0) / ∈ P(R); (vi)
transitive if, for all x,y,z ∈ X,[ ( x,y) ∈ R and (y,z) ∈ R] implies (x,z) ∈ R.
Note that reﬂexivity is equivalent to the set inclusion Rd ⊆ R. Furthermore, a tran-
sitive relation is consistent, and a consistent relation is P-acyclical. Transitivity implies
quasi-transitivity which, in turn, implies P-acyclicity. The reverse implications are not
true in general. However, the discrepancy between transitivity and consistency disappears
if the relation is reﬂexive and complete. See Suzumura (1983, p. 244). Consistency and
quasi-transitivity are independent. A reﬂexive, complete and transitive relation is called
an ordering.
The transitive closure of a relation R ⊆ X×X is denoted by R, that is, for all x,y ∈ X,
(x,y) ∈ R if there exist K ∈ N and x0,...,x K ∈ X such that x = x0,( xk−1,x k) ∈ R for
3all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and xK = y. Clearly, R is transitive and, because we can set K =1 ,
it follows that R ⊆ R.
For a set S ∈ Σ and a relation R ⊆ X × X, the set of R-maximal elements in S is
M(S,R)={x ∈ S | (y,x) / ∈ P(R) for all y ∈ S}.
A choice function C is maximal-element rationalizable, M-rationalizable for short, if there
exists a relation R on X, to be called an M-rationalization of C, such that C(S)=
M(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ.
Even though this paper is primarily concerned with maximal-element rationalizability,
a by-product of our analysis pertains to greatest-element rationalizability. Thus, we also
deﬁne the set of R-greatest elements in S as
G(S,R)={x ∈ S | (x,y) ∈ R for all y ∈ S},
and a choice function C is greatest-element rationalizable, G-rationalizable for short, if
there exists a relation R on X, to be called a G-rationalization of C, such that C(S)=
G(S,R) for all S ∈ Σ. Note that G(S,R) ⊆ M(S,R) holds for all S ∈ Σ and for any
relation R, where the set inclusion must be satisﬁed with an equality if R is reﬂexive and
complete.
Depending on the additional properties that we might want to impose on a ratio-
nalization (if any), diﬀerent notions of rationalizability can be deﬁned. For simplicity
of presentation, we use the following terminology. M stands for maximal-element ratio-
nalizability by an arbitrary M-rationalization, and R-M (respectively C-M; RC-M)i s
maximal-element rationalizability by means of a reﬂexive (respectively complete; reﬂex-
ive and complete) M-rationalization. A-M (respectively RA-M; CA-M; RCA-M)i s
maximal-element rationalizability by a P-acyclical (respectively reﬂexive and P-acyclical;
complete and P-acyclical; reﬂexive, complete and P-acyclical) M-rationalization, and
Q-M (respectively RQ-M; CQ-M; RCQ-M) is maximal-element rationalizability by a
quasi-transitive (respectively reﬂexive and quasi-transitive; complete and quasi-transitive;
reﬂexive, complete and quasi-transitive) M-rationalization. Furthermore, S-M (respec-
tively RS-M; CS-M; RCS-M) represents maximal-element rationalizability by a con-
sistent (respectively reﬂexive and consistent; complete and consistent; reﬂexive, com-
plete and consistent) M-rationalization. Analogously, T-M (respectively RT-M; CT-
M; RCT-M) denotes maximal-element rationalizability by a transitive (respectively re-
ﬂexive and transitive; complete and transitive; reﬂexive, complete and transitive) M-
rationalization. Finally, RC-G (respectively RCT-G) is greatest-element rationaliz-
4ability by a reﬂexive and complete (respectively reﬂexive, complete and transitive) G-
rationalization. In particular, we refer to RCT-G (and all notions that are equivalent to
it) as full rationalizability. All weaker rationalizability requirements are collected under
the term weak rationalizability.
3 Logical Relationships
We begin our analysis by providing a full description of the logical relationships which hold
between the diﬀerent notions of maximal-element rationalizability that can be deﬁned,
depending on which additional properties are imposed on an M-rationalization. For
convenience, a diagrammatic representation is employed: all axioms that are depicted
within the same box are equivalent, and an arrow pointing from one box b to another box
b0 indicates that the axioms in b imply those in b0, and the converse implication is not
true without further assumptions regarding the domain of C.
Theorem 1 Suppose Σ is an arbitrary non-empty domain. Then
CS-M, RCS-M, CT-M, RCT-M
↓
Q-M, RQ-M, CQ-M, RCQ-M, T-M, RT-M
↓
A-M, RA-M, CA-M, RCA-M, S-M, RS-M
↓
M, R-M, C-M, RC-M
Proof. The proof is organized as follows. In Step 1, we prove the equivalence of all
axioms that appear in the same box. In Step 2, we show that all implications depicted in
the theorem statement are valid. In Step 3, we provide examples demonstrating that no
further implications are true without additional assumptions.
Step 1 For each of the four boxes, we show that all axioms listed in the box are
equivalent.
1.a To establish the equivalence of the axioms in the top box, it is suﬃcient to show
that CS-M implies RCT-M. Suppose R is a complete and consistent M-rationalization
of C. Let R0 = R∪Rd. Clearly, R0 is reﬂexive. Furthermore, R0 is complete because R is.
Because consistency is equivalent to transitivity for a reﬂexive and complete relation, R0 is
5transitive. That R0 is an M-rationalization of C follows immediately from the assumption
that R is, given the deﬁnition of maximal-element rationalizability.
1.b The equivalences in the second box are established in Bossert, Sprumont and
Suzumura (2001).
1.c Now consider the third box. Clearly, it is suﬃcient to prove that RS-M implies
RCA-M and that A-M implies RS-M.
To prove the ﬁrst implication, suppose R is a reﬂexive and consistent rationaliza-
tion of C. As is straightforward to verify, the relation R0 = R ∪ N(R) is reﬂexive and
complete. Furthermore, because P(R0)=P(R), it follows immediately that R0 is an
M-rationalization of C.
Now suppose R is a P-acyclical M-rationalization of C. Deﬁning R0 =( R\I(R))∪Rd,
it follows immediately that R0 is a reﬂexive and consistent M-rationalization of C.
1.d The equivalence of the properties in the fourth box is established by showing that
M implies RC-M. Suppose R is an M-rationalization of C. Let R0 = R ∪ N(R). As
in Step 1.c, in view of P(R0)=P(R), it follows immediately that R0 is a reﬂexive and
complete M-rationalization of C.
Step 2 The strict implications depicted by the arrows in the theorem statement are
straightforward to verify.
Step 3 Given the equivalences established in Step 1, the examples deﬁned in Steps
3.a to 3.c suﬃce to complete the proof of the theorem.
3.a T-M does not imply CT-M.
Example 1 Let X = {x,y,z} and Σ={{x,y},{x,z},{y,z}}. Deﬁne the choice function
C by letting C({x,y})={x,y}, C({x,z})={z} and C({y,z})={y,z}. This choice
function is M-rationalizable by the transitive M-rationalization
R = {(z,x)}.
Suppose C is M-rationalizable by a complete and transitive M-rationalization R0.B y
deﬁnition of maximal-element rationalizability, we must have (z,x) ∈ P(R0) because x/ ∈
C({x,z}). Completeness of R0 implies, together with the deﬁnition of maximal-element
rationalizability, that we must have (x,y) ∈ I(R0) and (y,z) ∈ I(R0). By transitivity of
R0, it follows that (x,z) ∈ I(R0), a contradiction.
3.b S-M does not imply T-M.
Example 2 Let X = {x,y,z} and Σ={{x,y},{x,z},{y,z}}, and deﬁne C({x,y})=
{x}, C({x,z})={x,z} and C({y,z})={y}. This choice function is M-rationalizable
6by the consistent M-rationalization
R = {(x,y),(y,z)}.
Suppose R0 is a transitive M-rationalization of C. Because z ∈ C({x,z}), the deﬁnition
of maximal-element rationalizability implies (x,z) / ∈ P(R0). Again using the deﬁnition
of maximal-element rationalizability, we must have (x,y) ∈ P(R0) because y/ ∈ C({x,y})
and (y,z) ∈ P(R0) because z/ ∈ C({y,z}). The transitivity of R0 implies (x,z) ∈ P(R0),a
contradiction.
3.c M does not imply S-M.
Example 3 Let X = {x,y,z} and Σ={{x,y},{x,z},{y,z}}, and deﬁne C({x,y})=
{x}, C({x,z})={z} and C({y,z})={y}. This choice function is M-rationalizable by
the M-rationalization
R = {(x,y),(y,z),(z,x)}.
Suppose R0 is an M-rationalization of C. Because y/ ∈ C({x,y}), the deﬁnition of
maximal-element rationalizability implies (x,y) ∈ P(R0). Analogously, x/ ∈ C({x,z})
implies (z,x) ∈ P(R0), and z/ ∈ C({y,z}) implies (y,z) ∈ P(R0). This implies that R0 is
not consistent.
4 Weak Forms of M-Rationalizability
We now provide characterizations of the three weakest notions of M-rationalizability
identiﬁed in Theorem 1. In addition, we prove a result that employs the remaining
combination of the axioms considered in this section.
As as auxiliary step in formulating various sets of necessary and suﬃcient conditions,
we introduce some further deﬁnitions. Let
AC = {(S,y) | S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S)}
and
FC = {f:AC → X | f(S,y) ∈ S for all (S,y) ∈A C}.
The set AC contains all pairs consisting of a feasible set and an element that belongs to
the set but is not chosen by C. The only case where AC is empty occurs if C(S)=S
7for all S ∈ Σ, that is, all feasible elements are chosen in each and every choice situation.
The functions in FC also have an intuitive interpretation. They assign a feasible element
to each pair of a feasible set and an alternative that is not chosen therefrom. Within
our framework of maximal-element rationalizability, the intended interpretation is that
f(S,y) is an alternative in S that can be used to prevent y from being chosen. Clearly,
the existence of such an alternative for each (S,y)i nAC is a necessary condition for
maximal-element rationalizability.
The following properties of a function f ∈F C will be of importance in formulating
our conditions.
A For all (S,y) ∈A C, for all T ∈ Σ and for all x ∈ X,
[f(S,y)=x and x ∈ T] ⇒ y/ ∈ C(T).




k−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}⇒x
K / ∈ C(S
0).
B For all (S,y),(T,x) ∈A C,
f(S,y)=x ⇒ f(T,x) 6= y.








The properties A and A impose restrictions on the relationship between C and f, whereas
B and B are concerned with avoiding contradictory behavior of the function f itself.
Clearly, A implies A and B implies B by deﬁnition.
These properties enable us to introduce several axioms which completely characterize
various concepts of M-rationalizability. The AB-axiom below is introduced for complete-
ness of the analysis to be carried out in this section. Although it does not characterize
any of the rationalizability requirements introduced so far in this paper, it is worthwhile
to examine its consequences by characterizing all choice functions that satisfy the axiom.
For simplicity of exposition, we only mention one rationalizability property out of
each set of equivalent properties; clearly, additional equivalence results are obtained by
applying Theorem 1.
To begin with, the following axiom is necessary and suﬃcient for maximal-element
rationalizability on an arbitrary domain.
8AB-axiom: If AC 6= ∅, then there exists f ∈F C satisfying A and B.
We obtain the following characterization result.
Theorem 2 C satisﬁes M if and only if C satisﬁes the AB-axiom.
Proof. Step 1 We ﬁrst prove that M implies the AB-axiom. Let R beanM-rationalization
of C.I fAC = ∅, the AB-axiom is obviously satisﬁed.
Now suppose AC 6= ∅. To deﬁne a function f:AC → X with the desired properties,
consider any (S,y) ∈A C. By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that
R maximal-element rationalizes C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (x,y) ∈ P(R).
Deﬁne f(S,y)=x. Clearly, f(S,y) ∈ S for all (S,y) ∈A C by deﬁnition and, thus,
f ∈F C. We show that the function f satisﬁes A and B.
To establish A, suppose (S,y) ∈A C, T ∈ Σ and x ∈ X are such that f(S,y)=x
and x ∈ T. By the above deﬁnition of f, we obtain (x,y) ∈ P(R). Because R is an
M-rationalization of C, it follows that y/ ∈ C(T).
To establish B, let (S,y),(T,x) ∈A C and suppose f(S,y)=x. The deﬁnition of f
again implies (x,y) ∈ P(R). If f(T,x)=y, the same reasoning yields (y,x) ∈ P(R), a
contradiction. Thus, f(T,x) 6= y, establishing B.
Step 2 The proof is completed by establishing that the AB-axiom implies M. Suppose
C satisﬁes the AB-axiom. We construct an M-rationalization R of C.I f AC = ∅,a n y
relation R such that P(R)=∅ is an M-rationalization of C.
If AC 6= ∅, the AB-axiom implies the existence of a function f ∈F C satisfying A and
B.
Deﬁne R = {(f(S,y),y) | (S,y) ∈A C}. It remains to be shown that R is an M-
rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that (y,x) ∈ P(R), it follows from the
deﬁnition of R that there exists T ∈ Σ such that (T,x) ∈A C and f(T,x)=y. But this
contradicts A and, therefore, x is R-maximal in S. Hence, C(S) ⊆ M(S,R).
Now suppose x/ ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S,x). By deﬁnition of R, we obtain (y,x) ∈ R.
By way of contradiction, suppose we also have (x,y) ∈ R. Then there exists T ∈ Σ such
that (T,y) ∈A C and f(T,y)=x. But this contradicts B. Therefore, (x,y) / ∈ R and thus
(y,x) ∈ P(R). Hence, x is not R-maximal in S, and we obtain M(S,R) ⊆ C(S).
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.
Corollary 1 C satisﬁes RC-G if and only if C satisﬁes the AB-axiom.
9To establish this corollary to Theorem 2, we have only to recollect that M(S,R)=G(S,R)
holds for all S ∈ Σi fR is reﬂexive and complete. Simple though this corollary is, it
solves a perennial problem left open by Richter (1971, p. 36).1 Thus, our study of M-
rationalizability casts some light on the theory of G-rationalizability as a by-product.
Back, then, to the theory of M-rationalizability. The following condition characterizes
M-rationalizability by a P-acyclical M-rationalization.
AB: If AC 6= ∅, then there exists f ∈F C satisfying A and B.
We now obtain
Theorem 3 C satisﬁes A-M if and only if C satisﬁes the AB-axiom.
Proof. Step 1 We ﬁrst prove that A-M implies the AB-axiom. Let R be a P-acyclical
M-rationalization of C.I fAC = ∅, the proof of Step 1 is complete.
Now suppose AC 6= ∅. To deﬁne a function f:AC → X with the desired properties,
consider any (S,y) ∈A C. By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that
R maximal-element rationalizes C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (x,y) ∈ P(R).
Deﬁne f(S,y)=x. Again, it is clear that f(S,y) ∈ S for all (S,y) ∈A C. That A is
satisﬁed by the function f follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.
To establish B, suppose K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C are such that
f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition of f, we obtain (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R)
for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.I ff(S0,x 0)=xK, it follows that (xK,x 0) ∈ P(R). If K = 1, this
contradicts the hypothesis (x0,x K) ∈ P(R) and if K>1, we obtain a contradiction to
the P-acyclicity of R. Therefore, f(S0,x 0) 6= xK.
Step 2 The proof is completed by establishing that the AB-axiom implies A-M.
Suppose C satisﬁes the AB-axiom. If AC = ∅, we are done.
If AC 6= ∅, the AB-axiom implies the existence of a function f ∈F C satisfying A and
B.
Deﬁne R = {(f(S,y),y) | (S,y) ∈A C}. That R is an M-rationalization of C follows
as in the proof of Theorem 2. To show that R is P-acyclical, suppose K ∈ N \{ 1} and
x0,...,x K ∈ X are such that (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition of R,
this implies that there exist S1,...,SK ∈ Σ such that (Sk,x k) ∈A C and xk−1 = f(Sk,x k)
1Richter’s (1971, p. 36) Theorem 7 shows that a G-rational choice function with a complete G-
rationalization also has a complete and reﬂexive G-rationalization. However, he also observed that “[i]t
would be nice to have a behavioral characterization of [G-rational choice function with complete G-
rationalizations], but this remains an open problem.” Our Corollary 1 is a solution of this open problem.
10for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.I f( xK,x 0) ∈ P(R), there exists S0 ∈ Σ such that (S0,x 0) ∈A C
and xK = f(S0,x 0). But this contradicts B.
Likewise, transitive M-rationalizability is characterized by the following axiom.
AB-axiom: If AC 6= ∅, then there exists f ∈F C satisfying A and B.
The corresponding characterization result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 C satisﬁes Q-M if and only if C satisﬁes the AB-axiom.
Proof. Step 1 We ﬁrst prove that Q-M implies the AB-axiom. Let R be a transitive
M-rationalization of C.I fAC = ∅, the proof of Step 1 is complete.
Now suppose AC 6= ∅. To deﬁne a function f:AC → X with the desired properties,
consider any (S,y) ∈A C. By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that
R maximal-element rationalizes C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (x,y) ∈ P(R).
Deﬁne f(S,y)=x. Again, it is clear that f(S,y) ∈ S for all (S,y) ∈A C.
To show that f satisﬁes A, suppose K ∈ N,( S1,x 1),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C, S0 ∈ Σ
and x0 ∈ S0 are such that f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition,
(xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By quasi-transitivity of R,( x0,x K) ∈ P(R).
Because R is an M-rationalization of C, it follows that xK / ∈ C(S0).
To prove B, suppose K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C are such that f(Sk,x k)=
xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition of f, we obtain (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all
k ∈{ 1,...,K}. Because R is quasi-transitive, we obtain (x0,x K) ∈ P(R) and hence
(xK,x 0) / ∈ P(R). By deﬁnition of f, this implies f(S0,x 0) 6= xK.
Step 2 The proof is completed by establishing that the AB-axiom implies Q-M.
Suppose C satisﬁes the AB-axiom. If AC = ∅, we are done.
If AC 6= ∅, the AB-axiom implies the existence of a function f ∈F C satisfying A and
B.
Deﬁne R = {(f(S,y),y) | (S,y) ∈A C} and consider the transitive closure R of R.W e
show that R is an M-rationalization of C. Let S ∈ Σ and x ∈ S.
Suppose x ∈ C(S). If there exists y ∈ S such that (y,x) ∈ P(R), it follows that
there exist K ∈ N and (S1,x 1),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C such that, with x0 = y and xK = x,
xk−1 = f(Sk,x k) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. Letting S0 = S, we obtain a contradiction to A
and, thus, x is R-maximal in S. Hence, C(S) ⊆ M(S,R).
Finally, suppose x/ ∈ C(S). Let y = f(S,x). By deﬁnition of R and the transitive
closure of a relation, this implies (y,x) ∈ R ⊆ R. Suppose (x,y) ∈ R. Then there
11exist K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C such that (S0,x 0)=( S,x), xK = y and
f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.B y B, f(S0,x 0)=f(S,x) 6= xK = y,a
contradiction. Therefore, (x,y) / ∈ R and hence (y,x) ∈ P(R). Thus, x is not R-maximal
in S and, therefore, M(S,R) ⊆ C(S).
We conclude this section by characterizing all choice functions such that there exists
a function f ∈F C satisfying A and B whenever AC is non-empty. We say that a choice
function satisﬁes U-M if it possesses an M-rationalization R such that, for all K ∈ N,
for all x1,...,x K ∈ X, for all S0 ∈ Σ and for all x0 ∈ S0,
(x
k−1,x
k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}⇒x
K / ∈ C(S
0).
Furthermore, we deﬁne the following AB-axiom.
AB-axiom: If AC 6= ∅, then there exists f ∈F C satisfying A and B.
We conclude this section with a characterization of U-M.
Theorem 5 C satisﬁes U-M if and only if C satisﬁes the AB-axiom.
Proof. Step 1 We ﬁrst prove that U-M implies the AB-axiom. Let R be an M-
rationalization of C satisfying the property in the deﬁnition of U-M.I fAC = ∅, the
proof of Step 1 is complete.
Now suppose AC 6= ∅. To deﬁne a function f:AC → X with the desired properties,
consider any (S,y) ∈A C. By deﬁnition, S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S \ C(S). The assumption that
R maximal-element rationalizes C implies the existence of x ∈ S such that (x,y) ∈ P(R).
Deﬁne f(S,y)=x. It follows that f(S,y) ∈ S for all (S,y) ∈A C.
To prove that f satisﬁes A, suppose K ∈ N,( S1,x 1),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C, S0 ∈ Σ
and x0 ∈ S0 are such that f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition,
(xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.B yU-M, it follows that xK / ∈ C(S0). That B
is satisﬁed follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.
Step 2 The proof is completed by establishing that the AB-axiom implies U-M.
Suppose C satisﬁes the AB-axiom. If AC = ∅, we are done.
If AC 6= ∅, the AB-axiom implies the existence of a function f ∈F C satisfying A and
B.
Deﬁne R = {(f(S,y),y) | (S,y) ∈A C}. That R is an M-rationalization of C follows
as in the proof of Theorem 2. To complete the proof, we have to establish the property
in the deﬁnition of U-M. Suppose K ∈ N, x1,...,x K ∈ X, S0 ∈ Σ and x0 ∈ S0 are such
12that (xk−1,x k) ∈ P(R) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. By deﬁnition, there exist S1,...,SK ∈ Σ
such that (Sk,x k) ∈A C and xk−1 = f(Sk,x k) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.B yA, xK / ∈ C(S0).
5 Full Rationalizability
In general, the crucial feature of maximal-element rationalizability is to establish instances
of strict preference which prevent non-chosen alternatives to be maximal elements. As
is easy to verify, maximal-element rationalizability coincides with greatest-element ratio-
nalizability if a rationalization is required to be reﬂexive and complete. If transitivity is
imposed in addition (and, thus, full rationalizability is considered), instances of indiﬀer-
ence are important in addition to strict preferences; see Houthakker (1950) and Suzumura
(1977) for discussions. In our present context, it is therefore clear that the functions in
FC—the interpretation of which is concerned exclusively with strict preferences—are no
longer suﬃcient to provide an adequate framework for the formulation of necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for full rationalizability. However, we may preserve the general nature
of our approach and work with the following modiﬁcations of the analytical framework in
the previous section. Let
BC = {(S,y) | S ∈ Σ and y ∈ S}
and
GC = {g:BC → X | g(S,y) ∈ C(S) for all (S,y) ∈B C}.
The set BC contains all pairs consisting of a feasible set S and an alternative y that is in
S—y may or may not be in C(S). It follows that BC is non-empty because the domain of
C is non-empty and contains only non-empty subsets of X. Each of the functions in GC
assigns a chosen alternative to each pair of a feasible set and a feasible alternative. The
intended interpretation is that g(S,y) ∈ S represents a selection from C(S) that cannot
be prevented from being chosen by the presence of y.
Due to the more demanding nature of full rationalizability, the two separate types of
properties used in the previous section coincide and can be expressed in terms of a single
condition. We deﬁne the following restriction on g.








K / ∈ C(S
0).
13Rather than merely the existence of a function in GC with this property, a necessary and
suﬃcient condition for full rationalizability requires all functions in GC to satisfy D; again,
this is an immediate consequence of the more demanding nature of M-rationalizability
by an ordering and its equivalence to G-rationalizability.
D-axiom: For all g ∈G C, g satisﬁes D.
In the proof of our next characterization result, we make use of Richter’s (1966) char-
acterization of full rationalizability.2 Richter (1966) shows that the congruence axiom
is necessary and suﬃcient for greatest-element rationalizability by an ordering. In our
setting, congruence can be expressed as follows.
Congruence: For all K ∈ N and for all (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈B C,
[x
k−1 ∈ C(S





This property can be used to prove our characterization of full rationalizability.
Theorem 6 C satisﬁes CS-M if and only if C satisﬁes the D-axiom.
Proof. By Richter’s (1966) result and the observation that RCT-G is equivalent to
the axiom in the theorem statement, it is suﬃcient to establish the equivalence of the
congruence axiom and the D-axiom.
Step 1 We ﬁrst prove that the congruence axiom implies the D-axiom. Suppose C sat-
isﬁes the congruence axiom. Let g ∈G C and suppose that K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈
BC are such that g(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and g(S0,x 0)=xK. Because
g ∈G C, it follows that xk−1 ∈ C(Sk) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and xK ∈ C(S0). By the
congruence axiom, x0 ∈ C(S0) and, thus, g satisﬁes D.
Step 2 To prove the reverse implication, suppose that C satisﬁes the D-axiom. That
is, every g ∈G C satisﬁes D. Suppose K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈B C are such
that xk−1 ∈ C(Sk) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and xK ∈ C(S0). Let g ∈G C be such that
g(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and g(S0,x 0)=xK. Clearly, such a function g
exists. By the D-axiom, g satisﬁes D. Therefore, it follows that x0 ∈ C(S0) and hence
the congruence axiom is satisﬁed.
2See Hansson (1968) and Suzumura (1977; 1983, Chapter 2, Appendix A) for two alternative charac-
terizations.
146 Single-Valued Choice Functions
In the case of single-valued choice functions (that is, choice functions such that |C(S)| =1
for all S ∈ Σ, where |C(S)| is the cardinality of C(S)), our characterization of full
rationalizability can be simpliﬁed considerably. Note, however, that this is not the case
for weaker notions of M-rationalizability. This diﬀerence is due to the observation that
weak M-rationalizabilty merely requires every feasible element y, that is not chosen in a
set S, to be dominated (in the sense of strict preference) by an element x in S, where x
need not be chosen itself. Thus, the assumption that C(S) contains a single element only
does not simplify matters as far as the identiﬁcation of necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for M-rationalizable choice is concerned.
To characterize full rationalizability in the single-valued setting, our ﬁrst modiﬁca-
tion is to restrict attention to those functions f that map into C(S); due to the full-
rationalizability assumption, any element that is not chosen must be dominated by some
element in the chosen set, given that the rationalization is an ordering. We deﬁne
HC = {f:AC → X | f(S,y) ∈ C(S) for all (S,y) ∈A C}.
Our necessary and suﬃcient condition is the following E-axiom.
E-axiom: If AC 6= ∅, then there exists f ∈H C satisfying A.
We now prove our ﬁnal characterization result. As in the previous section, we make use of
Richter’s (1966) result and show that the congruence axiom is equivalent to the E-axiom
if C is single-valued.
Theorem 7 Suppose C is single-valued. C satisﬁes CS-M if and only if C satisﬁes the
E-axiom.
Proof. We assume that C is single-valued and prove the equivalence of congruence and
the E-axiom.
Step 1 Suppose C satisﬁes the congruence axiom. If AC = ∅, the result is immediate.
Now suppose AC 6= ∅. We deﬁne a function f ∈H C and show that, for that function, A
is satisﬁed. For all (S,y) ∈A C and for all x ∈ X, let f(S,y)=x if and only if x ∈ C(S).
Because C is single-valued, f is well-deﬁned and unique. To prove that the E-axiom is
satisﬁed, suppose K ∈ N,( S1,x 1),...,(SK,x K) ∈A C, S0 ∈ Σ and x0 ∈ S0 are such that
f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}.
15By way of contradiction, suppose xK ∈ C(S0). Because AC ⊆B C, it follows that
(S1,x 1),...,(SK,x K) ∈B C. Furthermore, by assumption, (S0,x 0) ∈B C. The congruence
axiom implies x0 ∈ C(S0) and, because C is single-valued, we must have x0 = xK.
Therefore, xK = x0 = f(S1,x 1) and, if K>1, xk−1 = f(Sk,x k) for all k ∈{ 2,...,K}.
By deﬁnition of f, this implies xK ∈ C(S1) and x1 ∈ S1 \ C(S1) and, furthermore,
xk−1 ∈ C(Sk) and xk ∈ Sk \ C(Sk) for all k ∈{ 2,...,K}. This is a contradiction to the
congruence axiom, which completes Step 1.
Step 2 Suppose C satisﬁes the E-axiom. To show that the congruence axiom is
satisﬁed, let K ∈ N and (S0,x 0),...,(Sk,x K) ∈B C be such that xk−1 ∈ C(Sk) for all
k ∈{ 1,...,K} and xK ∈ C(S0). If x0 = xK, the result is immediate.
Now consider the case x0 6= xK. Suppose there exist k,j ∈{ 0,...,K} such that k 6= j
and xk = xj. Without loss of generality, suppose that k<j .I fj = K, it follows that
xk = xK ∈ C(S0); if j<K , we obtain xk = xj ∈ C(Sj+1). In either case, a revealed
preference chain of a lower order is obtained because the elements xk,...,x j−1 can be
omitted. Because K is ﬁnite and x0 6= xK, this argument can be repeated suﬃciently many
times to obtain a revealed preference chain of some order where all elements are distinct.
Thus, we can without loss of generality assume that xk 6= xj for all k,j ∈{ 0,...,K} such
that k 6= j.
Because all elements in this revealed preference chain are distinct, single-valuedness
implies that xk ∈ Sk\C(Sk) for all k ∈{ 1,...,K} and, therefore, (S0,x 0),...,(SK,x K) ∈
AC. This implies AC 6= ∅ and, by the E-axiom, there exists f ∈H C satisfying A. Because
C is single-valued and f(S,y) ∈ C(S) for all (S,y) ∈A C by deﬁnition, it follows that
f(Sk,x k)=xk−1 for all k ∈{ 1,...,K}. Because xK ∈ C(S0), we obtain a contradiction
to A. Hence the case x0 6= xK cannot occur and the proof is complete.
7 Concluding Remarks
The classical notion of rational choice as purposive behavior has been extensively ex-
plored in the literature by interpreting purposive behavior as ‘optimizing behavior’ with
respect to some underlying preference relation or utility function. This paper analyzes
an alternative interpretation of purposive behavior as maximizing behavior with respect
to some underlying preference relation that need not be reﬂexive and complete. Within
the class of choice functions which are maximal-element rationalizable, we identify several
important sub-classes and characterize them in terms of intuitive axioms. No restrictions
on the domain of a choice function are imposed other than the non-emptiness of the do-
16main, and the decisiveness of choice. As a by-product of our analysis of maximal-element
rationalizability, we shed further light on a problem left open in the classical study by
Richter (1971) on greatest-element rationalizability.
Except for the case of full rationalizability (rationalizability by an ordering), our char-
acterizations involve existential clauses. This is sometimes seen as a shortcoming but it
seems to us that this objection, by itself, does not stand on solid ground: there is nothing
inherently undesirable in an axiom involving existential clauses. If the argument is that
existential clauses are diﬃcult to verify in practice, this is easily countered by the observa-
tion that universal quantiﬁers are no easier to check algorithmically (at least, in the case
of existential clauses, a search algorithm can terminate once one object with the desired
property can be found). Thus, in this respect, our conditions compare rather favorably
with those that are required for many forms of greatest-element rationalizability where
universal quantiﬁers play a dominant role.
We suspect that a major reason behind the reluctance to accept existential clauses in
the context of rational choice may be that conditions involving existential requirements
are seen as being ‘too close’ to the rationalizability property itself because the desired
property is expressed in terms of the existence of a rationalization. This is (except for
obvious cases) a matter of judgement, of course. Our view is that the combinations of the
axioms employed in the characterizations of the weak forms of rationalizability represent
an interesting and insightful way of separating the properties involved in maximal-element
rationalizability. Furthermore, the axioms we use appear to be rather clear and the roles
they play in the respective results have very intuitive interpretations. By deﬁnition of
maximal-element rationalizability, existential clauses appear naturally and it is therefore
not surprising that this feature is reﬂected in our conditions as well. Finally, we should
observe that the mathematical structures encountered are similar to those appearing in
dimension theory and, consequently, closely related complexities cannot but arise. In
fact, existential clauses appear in many of the characterization results in that area; see,
for example, Dushnik and Miller (1941).3
In concluding this paper, some remarks on further problems to be explored are in
order. Because we do not impose any restrictions on the domain of a choice function
(other than non-emptiness), our results are extremely general. As a result, our theorems
can be of relevance in whatever context of rational choice as purposive behavior we may
care to specify, which is an obvious merit of our general approach. Note, however, that our
3Dimension theory addresses the question of how many orderings are required to express a quasi-
ordering as the intersection of these orderings.
17approach may overlook some meaningful further directions to explore by being insensitive
to the structural properties of the domain which make perfect sense in the speciﬁc contexts
on which we are focussing. Two representative examples may be worthwhile to mention.
The ﬁrst structural property of the domain is ﬁnite additivity stating that, for any two
sets in the domain, their set-theoretical union is also a member of the domain. The second
structural property of the domain is coveredness: for any two sets in the domain, there
exists a member of the domain which contains the set-theoretical union of the two sets we
have started from. Note that the former structural property of the domain is not satisﬁed
by the Samuelson-Houthakker domain which consists of the budget sets in a commodity
space, whereas the latter structural property of the domain is. Indeed, the second property
can be construed as a generalization of the ﬁrst; it is also a property which is satisﬁed by
the Arrow-Sen domain with a ﬁnite universal set. We suggest that the exploration of the
theory of rational choice under one or the other of these restrictions (or yet others not
mentioned here) is a worthwile direction of future research in the speciﬁc context of our
discourse.
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